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Abstract  
Bearing in mind the current instability in the definition of the objectives of a company 
and the alignment of all members of a company with these objectives, it is fundamental 
for organizations to have an effective Corporate Governance Model, which maximizes 
the interests of shareholders. This need for the creation of effectiveness is enhanced in 
organizations with peculiar equity structures.  
Thus, this project includes the analysis of some of the key conditions for an effective 
Corporate Governance and then the study of a particular Portuguese company in the air 
industry, which has had frequent equity structure changes and is now 50% owned by the 
state.  Therefore, the aim of the project is to identify Corporate Governance trends and 
relate these trends to the company's equity structure.  
Through the analysis of relevant documents of the company and some insights of current 
and past members of the latter, belonging to Governances with different equity structures, 
it could be concluded that there are no significant differences in the models and 
procedures adopted within both Governances, mainly due to the fact that the Management 
of the company was private in both moments.  
Moreover, it could also be concluded that there still is a long path to be gone through by 
the company in order to improve its Corporate Governance.  
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Introduction 
The idea that the governance of a company is the same for all companies has been 
changing more and more, as the years go by. Over the past years, there have been 
significant changes in the assumptions that hold the Corporate Governance models. 
On the one hand, there has been an increasing trend of separation between executive and 
supervisory functions. Therefore, the power has been decentralized instead of 
concentrated in a single entity inside the company. On the other hand, it has been 
highlighted that the members with supervisory functions must be independent. Meaning, 
their present, or past personal and professional relations cannot interfere with their 
function within the company. As such, the process of governing the company has been 
more and more taken care of. This assures that the company's operations are in line with 
the professional and even ethical standards required by the market and society lowering 
specific interests of a group of shareholders or managers. Moreover, with better 
governance, the common objectives defined in the company's strategy would be easily 
attained. Moreover, there also have been more frequent changes in the equity structure of 
several companies which generates variations in the respective governance models, 
namely between a state-owned or a private company. In fact, if in a company the State 
has a majority, the strategy could comply certain political and social objectives, instead 
of only maximizing profits. On the contrary, if the company is mainly private, the 
maximization of shareholder value should be the main objective, including the value 
creation for all stakeholders. Therefore, there is no longer one model for all the 
companies, but alternative models, with some variations, which change over time 
according to the company's equity situation. 
With this research, I want to understand if the variations in the ownership structure of a 
company have an impact on its Corporate Governance model. Moreover, I propose to 
conclude if there are any trends in the Corporate Governance models due to the company's 
shareholder profile, namely when a company is mainly private, or state-owned. My 
motivation for this research is the result of the current discussions about the impact of the 
Corporate Governance in the performance and value creation vis a vis the more or the 
less, active role of the State as a shareholder. 
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1. Corporate Governance  
There exist several definitions regarding Corporate Governance and the concepts 
surrounding this term. However, this concept comprises two notions which I consider 
fundamental. 
On the one hand, it includes a set of rules and policies for decision-making and also for 
the distribution of responsibilities within a company (Canals, 2010; Boubakri, 2011; 
Hardwick, Adams, & Zou, 2011; M.Miller, 2011; Guetat, Jarboui, & Boujelbene, 2015).  
This set is intended to guide the company on its duties, which comprise the maximization 
of profits through its operation while following an ethical code of conduct which should 
be against any type of corruption.  
On the other hand, the definition of Corporate Governance includes monitoring 
mechanisms, either internal, external or both, that ensure the policies mentioned above 
are executed, which secures the protection of the Shareholder’s wealth. As a matter of 
fact, these control measures come as a response to several aspects from which I highlight 
the Agency theory, which describes a situation where managers may act with the aim of 
achieving their personal objectives instead of the company’s interests. Therefore, these 
mechanisms may enable their supervision (Canals, 2010; Jarboui, & Boujelbene, 2014); 
But also make the company more attractive, either to investors or high skilled workers, 
which seek to be get connected with it. 
There are some interesting topics that are essential to address when talking about the 
Corporate Governance of a company and that determine its success. Some are highlighted 
bellow. 
1.1.Board Composition 
The board composition a large factor when accessing if the board is or is not effective.  
Its characteristics should demonstrate that the board is capable of representing the 
interests of shareholders, in a fair manner.  
Firstly, the Board should assure that the majority of its members should be independent, 
which implies not having any relationships that obstruct the capability of the director 
taking its position in complying with the interests of the shareholders. Therefore, the 
board should be mainly composed of outside directors, which have the ability to criticize 
the company in a more unbiased way. Moreover, these directors bring a variety of 
experiences which the inside directors do not usually have (Demb et al., 1992).  
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Also, the size of the board is fundamental in the governance of a company. This aspect is 
related to the type of company, how big and developed it is. Larger boards have the benefit 
of having more members with different skills which complement each other. A small 
board is more cohesive and solves its issues with fewer complications. Therefore, the 
benefits of one or another depending on the specific company.  
Another very important aspect is the diversification of board members in terms of 
background, skills, experiences, and expertise according to the company's industry and 
circumstances (women, minorities, different backgrounds and young/new people – long-
term value creation for the company). It is believed that different board members may 
positively impact the success of the governance of the company, because it is easier to 
keep up with the constantly changing environment in the industry and the business (E. 
Watson, Johnson, & Merritt, 1998; Canals, 2010; Garratt, 2010; Rao & Tilt, 2016).  
On the other hand, the eligibility criteria is also fundamental to ensure successful 
governance. This process is conducted through a nomination committee (if it exists), 
which is previously elected by the board and composed of independent members. This 
committee votes on the directors to be elected. Moreover, a director may also resign or 
be removed by other directors (Despite this last option is very difficult to occur because 
it involves a complex process). This election determines the board, which will, therefore, 
be responsible for representing the shareholders, role of major importance. The selection 
criteria should, therefore, be based on some aspects, such as the member's skills, 
experience, personality, among others. Moreover, after the election, there should be 
continuous training for board members, in order to ensure that they are familiar with the 
matrix of the company and aligned with its objectives. 
1.2.Board Professionalization and Training 
The governance of a company may lead to conflicts of interest. In order to cease these 
conflicts, the Board of Directors should be more professional, either in its nomination and 
procedures. Moreover, it should have external experts to conduct the Board’s training 
activity. Additionally, the CEO and chairman should comprise two different roles 
(operational and supervisory roles, respectively) to avoid conflicts of interest and a more 
efficient board and management. Also, having formal regulation and continually 
improving the existing one on procedures regarding the directors and related issues which 
may lead to a conflict of interest improves the company's governance. Another key issue 
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is informing the stakeholders of this regulation. Finally, some board reunions in order to 
discuss key issues should frequently exist. These reunions would lead to better decision 
making. Those should also serve to audit the company activity, for instance, through an 
audit committee whose members should be carefully selected. 
1.3.Board Members Remuneration and Assessment 
The Board’s evaluation exercise may be included in the company’s regulation, but this 
exercise may also come as a choice of the board itself.  
The assessment process, including the rules and methodology used, depends upon the 
company’s circumstances and culture. Therefore, the evaluation process varies from 
company to company. There is not a common methodology accepted globally, but an 
adaptation to the company’s situation and preferences. However, this process should be 
conducted, at least, once a year (for instance, during the company’s annual strategic 
formulation), in order to detect dysfunctionalities in the Board’s behavior and act 
according to these dysfunctionalities.  The process may be conducted by internal bodies, 
such as the nomination committee, but the company may benefit from an external expert 
who could expedite the process and make it simpler. A significant amount of companies 
prefers the process to be conducted only by an external expert, to ensure transparency, 
impartiality, and insights about the board that an internal member would hardly see.  
The assessment process starts with an insight of the chairperson regarding the need for an 
evaluation exercise and by whom this exercise should be conducted. After the board’s 
decision, the process itself begins. This latter involves the identification of critical areas, 
that need evaluation; For each area, the formulation of a questionnaire with several 
questions, whose responses are obtained in a rating scale; interviews with individual 
directors to complement the questionnaire with qualitative data; then, the analysis of all 
this quantitative and qualitative data and the reporting of the results to the Board. With 
these results, the board may understand the areas where it needs to improve and develops 
an action plan that may be reviewed on a frequent basis until its dysfunctionalities get 
smaller or even cease completely. These action plan may include small arrangements to 
board processes that need to be optimized; or structural changes in the company's Board 
committees. 
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Each Director of the board could also be evaluated. This may be a self or peer assessment, 
according to the company’s choice. Some companies prefer not to conduct this exercise, 
in order to avoid the emphasis on each member, in place of the Board as a whole.  
The evaluation process is similar. However, the assessment variables may change, 
including, for instance, the interpersonal skills of the director; the participation in board 
meetings; among others. 
 
1.4. Succession Plan  
Succession planning is one of the key factors to address when talking about the success 
of Corporate Governance. This concept implies that there is a plan for the election of new 
directors if the remaining ones leave the Board. Its objective is to ensure that the positions 
within the Board are filled and there are no gaps that prejudice the function of the Board. 
More detailed planning enables the company to reduce uncertainty and pressure, as all 
scenarios are covered and the probability of something going wrong because of some 
unexpected gap gets very low. Moreover, the planning allows choosing a director that is 
familiar with the culture and objectives of the company, which may prevent potential 
business interruptions or reduce the training for this director.  
To start a good succession planning, the first step is to revise the existing regulation within 
the company for the Board of Directors, as it may include several important factors for 
the eligibility criteria and Board requirements, such as the independence requirements; 
the expected experience or background; the maximum number of members for each body; 
information regarding the possibility of renewal and the committee and officer positions 
held. Then, it is important to consider the actual Board members, they’re current positions 
and the expiry date for their functions. This analysis enables to understand the positions 
that will need to be filled and the timing for it. In parallel with this exercise, the 
nominating committee (if it exists one), should talk with the directors on a frequent basis 
to understand their preferences in terms of positions to hold, as well as their intentions 
regarding their commitment with the current positions they are holding.  Moreover, if 
there is a need for outside recruitment, there must be a study of the skills, background, 
and experience needed for the respective positions and a recruitment plan should be 
conducted. Despite most of the times, the recruitment is conducted internally, either way, 
there must be training for the members who assume new positions. 
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1.5.Minority Shareholders’ Participation  
It is beneficial both for the state and the private companies that the shareholders 
comprising these companies have equal importance and treatment. Besides being 
important for the state reputation, this practice also proves to be beneficial for the 
company itself which becomes more valuable.  
The Shareholders of a company have several rights and obligations, including the right to 
vote, to be on meetings, to receive dividends, to know how the company’s performance 
is, among others. The controlling shareholder, by having more power, takes the majority 
of decisions, including the choice of board members, capital increases or control changes. 
Sometimes these shareholder rights are not respected when the government takes a 
significant decision regarding the company, such as a capital increase. However, the 
minority shareholders existence is very important and if their rights are violated, 
investment in the company won’t be that attractive, assets become less valuable and the 
funds given by the minority shareholders may cease.  There must be a regulation that 
ensures this equitable treatment. If there are private sector strategic investors. There may 
be agreements between shareholders on the regulation. When there are not, general rules 
should be created and followed. As such, the procedures adopted by the company should 
be in line with the equal treatment of all shareholders.  
Additionally, besides ensuring this equality in law terms, the majority shareholder (state) 
should also encourage minority shareholders to be active in order for them to feel part of 
the company as owners. This shareholders’ activism implies that the minority 
shareholders are represented in all actions that the company engages in. For instance, they 
should take part in the nomination of the Board of Directors. The majority shareholder 
has the “voice” and may be able to elect the board by himself. However, some agreements 
could be created in which the minority shareholders would choose some members for 
some certain positions, or participate in the nomination criteria, among other possibilities.   
Also, minority shareholders should participate in the shareholder's meetings that will 
enable the minority shareholders to be accountable for the company's issues. As such, the 
company as a whole and the state should encourage active participation at these meetings.  
Finally, minority shareholders should also ensure that the law on transactions exists and 
is followed (For instance, all transactions above a certain value should be approved by all 
shareholders). Namely, if the majority holder in the state, there is the danger that those 
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transactions comprise a conflict of interest that benefit the state instead of the company. 
As such, once again, the minority shareholders’ interests could be foregone.  
 
1.6.Internal Control Mechanisms 
As mentioned, a company must have control mechanisms to ensure good governance 
within the company. Those might be internal and external.  
On the one hand, the internal mechanisms are assured by internal bodies of the company.  
The Board of Directors, for instance, is responsible for the monitoring of the activity of 
the management team, to assure the maximization of the wealth of shareholders and 
compliance with the regulation. Therefore, it is important to assure the existence of 
independent board members, free of any type of interests within the company they are 
monitoring, because it leads to more quality control.  
The Board committees, which include the Nomination, Remuneration and Audit 
committees also play key roles in the governance of a company.  The Nomination 
committee defines the eligibility criteria and process for the Board members. Therefore, 
according to these criteria, there are potential candidates for board members, which are 
then presented and discussed in the General Meeting. This board minimizes the 
probability of election based on interests inside the company; The Remuneration 
committee defines the reward policies for board members and also evaluate their 
performance. As such, as the performance control is higher, it also is the probability of 
success of the governance. Moreover, the remuneration should take into account the 
market conditions in the industry; Finally, the Audit Committee is responsible for 
assessing the reliability and compliance of the financial reporting with legal regulation 
and may include internal and external auditors. The information revised and presented by 
the Audit committee minimize the risk of corruption and help the Board of Directors when 
approving the annual accounts and defining the company's strategy.   
In Portugal, the Remuneration and Nomination committee functions may be assumed by 
the General shareholder meetings (Silva et al., 2006). 
 
1.7.Corporate Governance for SOEs 
For a company to have an effective Corporate Governance, there are several aspects 
that the latter needs to consider, of which the most important I have mentioned above. 
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For a company which is totally or partially owned by the State, there are additional 
challenges for the success of the governance (Syrett and Bertotti, 2012; Schwarting, 
2013). It is very important that these obstacles are overpassed, especially regarding 
some particular companies, due to the critical functions assumed by them. Namely, 
the assurance of some public utilities, the increasing contribution to the world’s gross 
domestic product and the also increasing employment of the population (Ysa et al., 
2012; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014; Kankaanpää et al., 2014). The largest challenge is 
related to the fact that the state is entitled to an ownership function in the company 
and also of managing the country. Therefore, the latter must be able to separate both 
these functions. If not, there would be the danger of a multiplicity of goals and, 
consequently, conflicts of interests between the State and the company's objectives, 
which include the maximization of the wealth of all shareholders. As such, and 
depending on the company, there needs to be a balance between the effectiveness of 
public provision and the need for maximizing the shareholder’s  objectives. Meaning, 
there should not be undesired political interferences in the management of the 
company, for instance by providing special State subsidies to this company, 
benefiting the latter with lower tax amounts or even using the money owned by the 
State to benefit the company, among other possibilities. Otherwise, both the state and 
the company as a whole would be joining the unfair competition and mixing public 
issues with company issues (OECD, 2005, 2015).  
1.7.1. Internal Control Mechanisms 
The internal control mechanisms adopted comprise the policies conducted bodies inside 
the company, including the Board of Directors and the General assembly, for instance. 
Therefore, a crucial topic is that the company’s Directors are independent. This concept 
should be materialized when electing a Director, by assessing its relations with the 
political power and other executives of the company.  
Regarding the monitoring of the company, the lower the number of shareholders, the 
smaller the dispersion in the interests of different shareholders, which eases the 
controlling process.  However, this process may not be as efficient as it would be in a 
private company. Firstly, despite the conflicts of interest among shareholders may be 
lower, the incentives for the State members to monitor the Management team may also 
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be lower because there are no palpable incentives for these members, which could neglect 
the surveillance.  
Also, Politicians have no special expertise that makes them eligible for the evaluation of 
the performance of the company nor for the advisory of the management team. Moreover, 
as the political environment is very unstable, so can be the State Bodies members’ and 
functions.Therefore, if the company is only owned by the state, this would be a crucial 
obstacle to overcome. 
 
1.7.2. External Control mechanisms  
External control mechanisms are conducted at the level of creditors, investors, and even 
competition, for instance. This monitoring is mainly led through embarrassment. 
Meaning, managers know that they need to be accountable for their actions.  
Especially regarding competition, it enables the establishment of a benchmark for 
managers. Meaning, the stronger the competition, the better the management team needs 
to perform its functions in order to attain the expected profit. Moreover, if the competition 
is stronger members may be compared with the managers from other companies, which 
motivates them to increase their effort. For SOE’s competition is not that important due 
to the fact that these companies do not operate the same way as private companies, 
because their objective is different. The SOE’s goal is not only the profit but the society’s 
wealth maximization.  
Therefore, it could be concluded that SOEs are harder to control externally than internally. 
As such, the company should focus on the internal control mechanisms as the most 
effective manner to assess the performance of the managers and other company members.  
Regarding concrete mechanisms, there are not many variations from those of private 
enterprises. The aspects mentioned above are essential for any company to have effective 
governance, whether it is private, totally or partially state-owned. 
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2. Data and Methodology  
 
2.1.Methodological Approach 
This project intends to clarify the impact of different ownership structures, which make a 
particular company mainly public or private, on the Corporate Governance procedures 
and models of this company. For this purpose, it is necessary to analyze several 
organizational elements of the company and how these elements work together.  
Therefore, I have decided to follow a qualitative approach which enables the 
understanding of the decision-making process of an organization and the functioning of 
its governance, through the deep study of the procedures within the organization, as well 
as the relationships and inside perspectives among its members.  
 
2.1.1. Case Study Presentation 
The reason for the choice of the company under analysis lies in the fact that it is a 
Portuguese company which has been under several changes over recent years and is 
positioned in a situation never seen before in Portugal due to its rare equity structure and 
strong political influence. Moreover, it belongs to a very dynamic industry, which makes 
it more interesting to analyze due to the strong competition within the latter.  
TAP is a Portuguese airline, created after the second world war II, in 1945, under the 
name of “Secção de Transportes aéreos”. It came as an answer to the need of connecting 
Portugal to the world, in an era in which the airplane industry was growing faster and 
faster. By then, the company was state-owned, and the director was a Portuguese Air 
Force General and politician, Humberto Delgado.  From 1946 the first flights were 
conducted, to destinations like Madrid, Luanda, and Porto. The airline company was 
indeed growing with new and diversified routes and a new image that attracted people to 
fly and choose TAP. The company grows brought more innovation, employment, and 
investment.  In 1953, while new routes where continually being explored, the first 
privatization process came, which led TAP to be an anonymous society of limited 
responsibility (SARL in Portuguese).  In the meantime, in the 60’s TAP continued to 
grow, with new planes, the possibility of including more people in their planes and the 
acquisition of the first "Boeing" models.  The 70’s were times of great changes, with TAP 
becoming state-owned once again, because of the revolution of 1974. Moreover, in this 
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and the following decades, the company started placing much importance on the 
technological improvement, consistent with the use of more advanced airplanes in several 
routes and the new computerized reserves and "check-in" systems.  
In recent years, TAP has been struggling with its ownership, due to some government 
disagreements and private investors issues. In 2015, at the end of the political mandate of 
PSD (Center-right government), led by Pedro Passos Coelho, TAP was partially 
privatized. Portugal needed to obtain its three-year national bailout. Therefore, it had to 
sell its interests in several companies, which included the state airline. TAP aimed at 
selling a stake of 66%, of which 5% would be for the employees. In the meanwhile, this 
privatization was generating a large controversy among all the employees, which included 
some staff strikes, who were not beneficial to the company. Finally, in June 2015, the 
government decided to sell TAP Air Portugal to the Atlantic Gateway consortium formed 
by the partnership between David Neeleman and Humberto Pedrosa, a Portuguese 
entrepreneur. Therefore, its ownership has changed, becoming majority-owned by the 
Atlantic Gateway Consortium, which purchased 61% from Portugal's government and 
still had the option of buying the remaining 34% in 2018. However, the changes hadn’t 
stopped yet, and, on October 2015, a new Portuguese government, PS (left wing) took the 
lead and has retrieved TAP’s majority control to the state, which was officialized in 
February 2016, through a deal with the private consortium, which indicates that the 
company is 50% owned by the Portuguese state, 45% by the Atlantic Gateway 
Consortium and 5% available shareholder to collaborators and employees of TAP Air 
Portugal. This retrieve included some restructuring measures within the group, which 
included new fleet and routes, among others. 
 
2.2.Data collection techniques  
This project analysis requires the combination of primary and secondary data in order to 
study and compare TAP’s governance procedures in two different stages: when the 
Portuguese Government had less influence; and nowadays, when the State has more 
influence. Therefore, the data collected includes already existing data, collected for other 
purposes, and new data, collected for this study.  
More specifically, some documents were used for this project, like the Annual report of 
the last three years (2015, 2016 and 2017) and the Shareholder Structure detail, described 
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in the Corporate Governance Report (2015). The Annual reports include a section with 
some information on the company’s Corporate Governance, useful to understand TAP’s 
equity structure in recent years, including its shareholders and their contribution; the 
existing councils and departments that assure the company’s governance; what are TAP’s 
main significative risks and how the risk management is done internally. All these 
documents were carefully studied before the interviews and were fundamental to get the 
first picture on TAP's governance past and current position. 
After collecting the secondary data mentioned before, some interviews were conducted, 
as core primary data, which allowed to answer particular and more profound questions 
on TAP’s Corporate Governance internal mechanisms and processes. This inside 
information is fundamental to compare the mechanisms used in both situations mentioned 
above. This stage had 2 phases, which comprised the interviewing of a company 
representative from the past governance of TAP when the company was mainly private; 
and the interviewing of a company representative from the actual TAP governance. Both 
interviewees asked that their personal information was not disclosed, including their 
names and particular functions within the company. Both these interviews were prepared 
and followed a set of questions. However, with the objective of enriching the 
conversation, there was flexibility in the interviews, in order to benefit from the insight 
of the interviewees on important aspects of the company that were not mentioned in the 
questions.  
The conducted interviews focused on the determinants to have a good Corporate 
Governance system, such as the rules and control mechanisms inside the company; the 
nomination and remuneration policies; the interaction between shareholders; the Board 
members assessment, among others. 
 
2.3.Interview Script 
The interviews script was carefully prepared to address several aspects of the governance 
of the company. The questions were divided into several blocks according to their topic.  
The blocks include: The Board members election Criteria and process - Rules for election, 
Key profile of a board member; The training elected board members – On-Boarding 
Programmes, Continuous education; The interaction between shareholders – Conflicts 
between the state and private shareholders; Minority shareholders importance and 
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treatment; Board members performance assessment – Internal mechanisms, self-
assessment; Succession Plan; Remuneration committee – Policies followed and its 
approval, remuneration development; Governance composition – Number of bodies, 
Importance of the supervisory council; Governance Rules – Body in charge, Regulation 
revision; Risk Management – Main risks, mechanisms against the risks; Internal 
Communication Policy – Transparency with all stakeholders, Communication means.  
Therefore, as asking this set of questions to the TAP’s executives in two different times 
of governance, allowed to establish comparisons and understand how Corporate 
Governance behaviors vary according to different equity structures.  
In the Annex 9.2., it is presented the full script.  
 
2.4.Sample 
Bearing in mind the time, agenda and contact constraints of TAP’s representatives, it was 
very difficult to interview a large variety of members. Therefore, the selection was made 
according to their hierarchical position. Namely, the interviewed members’ criteria were 
holding a position that enabled to have an insight into the Corporate Governance policies 
and mechanisms. The second criteria were that these members could not be from the same 
governance mandate, in order to have different insides of the process when the company 
was private and public. Despite these interviews were only conducted with 2 members of 
different mandates, the script was available to them 2 weeks before the interview, in order 
to enable their preparation and discussion with other company representatives, which 
could enrich the interview.  
 
2.5.Data Analysis 
The information was analyzed through a qualitative approach, which allowed to better 
organize the data and understand it better. This analysis was divided into two stages. In 
the first stage, both the primary and secondary data were carefully red to generally 
understand all ideas and identify the main important ones.  
In the second stage, involved dividing the text according to the blocks mentioned before, 
in order to organize the data into topics and identify the core ideas inside these blocks.  
Then, by once again studying the core ideas into the different blocks, it was easier to 
establish relations between the information in these blocks and make conclusions.  
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3. Results on TAP Corporate Governance Model and Procedures 
 
3.1.Board composition  
 
3.1.1. Board size 
In TAP, there is a Shareholders Agreement which defines the composition of the different 
corporate bodies. Therefore, it includes the number of members appointed by Atlantic 
Gateway and also the number of members appointed by the State.  
TAP’s Board of Directors is composed of twelve members, of which six were appointed 
by Parpública and six by Atlantic Gateway, elected at the General Meeting. From among 
the six Board Members designated, and after consultation with Atlantic Gateway, 
Parpública appoints the Chairman of the Board. 
As the management of the company is private, the Executive Committee is made up of 
three of the six Board Members appointed by Atlantic Gateway. Atlantic Gateway, after 
consultation with Parpública, indicates its composition and chooses the CEO. 
Therefore, it could be concluded that the functions of both the private consortium and the 
state are aligned and well-coordinated. Moreover, the shareholders’ interests of both 
blocks (private and public) are well represented, which makes it easier for the governance 
to succeed.  
On a final note, there are some previewed mechanisms in case of conflict of objectives 
between the State and the private shareholders – namely in the case of a political objective 
and an economical one. However, these mechanisms' details could not be disclosed. 
 
3.1.2. Board Member Profile 
Within TAP, all Board Members must have relevant management capacity and 
experience, preferentially in the air transport business. Also, the CEO shall have 
recognized track-record in the industry. 
The company positively values diversification and has the policy of not discriminating 
minorities. Moreover, as mentioned above, it considers as a key factor that Executive and 
Board members have expertise in the area, keeping in mind that the familiarity with the 
industry indeed is an eliminatory factor. 
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3.1.3. Board Professionalization and Training 
"As mentioned above, it is the shareholders who choose the Board of Directors – not the 
company. For that reason, the "on-boarding" process is mainly provided by them. TAP 
has no specific programme for the "on-boarding" process of a Board Member."1 
The Board members are all chosen by the shareholders of the company. Therefore, all 
training is provided by them on an individual level, which means there is not a specific 
On-Boarding Process.  
Due to the same reason mentioned above, there is not a training programme for the new 
members. According to the view of the company, the corporate bodies' members are 
chosen through a rigorous and careful process and due to their experience and track 
record, there is no need for training.  
 
3.2.Board Members’ Remuneration and Assessment 
 
3.2.1. Remuneration 
TAP has a remuneration committee which is responsible for the establishment of 
remuneration policies and the approval of the remunerations of all members of the 
company, according to these policies, which should follow some criteria, such as the 
company’s strategy, ethics, benchmarking with other companies from the same industry, 
among others.  This committee is composed of some independent members, which 
ensures transparency and equality in remunerations, very important for the perseverance 
of the ethics of the company.  
 
3.2.2. Assessment  
“Up to now, there is no system approved to assess the Board performance.”2 
Regarding the assessment of Corporate Bodies, TAP does not have a formal process either 
for the self-evaluation of Board members nor for the measurement of Board Performance 
by external members.  
 
                                                 
1 Company representative 2 
2 Company representative 2 
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3.3.Succession Plan  
“The Shareholders Agreement defines that the shareholders appoint the Board Members. 
Hence, there is no succession plan approved by any other corporate body.”3 
As previously mentioned, TAP’s Board and Executive members are elected by the 
Shareholders, which is consistent with the Shareholder’s Agreement.  
Therefore, the company defends that there is no need of having a formal Succession Plan, 
as the shareholders are the only ones with power regarding this kind of matters.   
 
3.4.Minority Shareholders’ Participation  
“The Minority shareholders have no direct representation at the Board. However, they 
are heard and taken into consideration through institutional channels (e.g., they can be 
and always are present at General Meetings).”4 
In TAP’s case, minority shareholders include the company’s employees, which own 5% 
of the company shares.  
On the one hand, this procedure is very beneficial for the involvement of the employee in 
the company. By having some participation in TAP’s equity structure, the employees feel 
more motivated and conscious that their work impacts the company. Moreover, this fact 
attracts investors, which seek TAP as a wealthy company with strong bonds with their 
workers. The TAP employees which own company shares, do not have a direct 
representation in the Board. Therefore, they have no stake in big matters such as voting 
for some new members or capital increases in the company. They are, however, incited 
by majority shareholders to participate in the General meetings, where some important 
issues are discussed, such as the strategy and the appointment of new directors.  
 
3.5.Internal Control Mechanisms  
"The Audit and Financial Matters Committee is new (has less than one year of existence).  
The Committee competencies are set out in the Committee regulation. There is a workflow 
approved which includes, for instance, an annual monitoring plan of important issues 
such as corporate risks, auditing and budget preparation, and execution, among others."5 
                                                 
3 Company representative 2 
4 Company representative 1 
5 Company representative 1 
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TAP has some internal control mechanisms and procedures, fundamental to an effective 
Corporate Governance, some of which were mentioned above, such as Remuneration 
committee, which exists within TAP and could be improved  through a better career’s 
development programme; the rigorous and careful selection criteria, which is performed 
by shareholders, but could also be developed by a nomination committee or external 
members to the company; among other more detailed mechanisms, such as risk 
management, which were not disclosed.  
Another important and still not mentioned topic within TAP mechanisms is the Audit and 
Financial Matters committee. This committee is new within TAP and was created 
following the privatization and the shareholder agreement to reconfigure the shareholder 
structure in 2017. The Committee competencies are set out in the Committee regulation. 
There is a workflow approved which includes, for instance, an annual monitoring plan of 
important issues such as corporate risks, auditing and budget preparation, and execution, 
among others. This committee is composed of some external members, which ensures 
transparency and information disclosure regarding the current financial position of the 
company. This committee enables the minimization of risk in the company’s business 
operations and governance.  
Regarding the Corporate Governance models and rules, those are defined by the 
Shareholder’s Agreement. The company has been improving its Corporate Governance 
since its structure changes, which include some undisclosed changes in the shareholder's 
agreement, implemented by the Board. 
 
3.6.Communication Policy 
TAP’s Governance Communication Policy is defined by the Shareholder’s Agreement 
and other Board level regulations. Moreover, internally, there is a communication plan 
which is implemented by the management team. Therefore, the company aims at 
transparency regarding some institutional issues and also regarding its financial position.  
As mentioned above, this type of procedures involves all the employees of the company 
which, consequently, motivate them on their respective works.  
Moreover, this procedure enhances the wealth of the company and attracts investors. 
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4. Changes in TAP’s Corporate Governance due to changes in equity structure 
Following the shareholder equity changes in 2017, where the State, through Parpública, 
acquired 50% of TAP’s share capital, seven new members were appointed for the Board 
of Directors, while six members from Atlantic Gateway left the governance of the 
company. Therefore, the members appointed by both blocks got equal.  
Regarding the bodies that comprise the Corporate Governance of a company, everything 
else kept the same, which is mainly because the management of the company kept private 
and the private consortium with large participation in the company. The existing bodies 
were and still are: The General Meeting committee; The Board of Directors; The 
executive committee; The Supervisory Board and the Official Accountant. Recently, two 
more bodies were created, due to the constant evolvement of the Corporate Governance 
models:  The Audit and Financial Affairs body, composed of external auditors, in charge 
of monitoring the company's governance; and a Strategy body, in charge of helping the 
Board of Directors defines the strategy of the firm, in cooperation with the management 
team. It could then be concluded there were no meaningful changes in terms of Corporate 
Governance procedures and mechanisms.  
The size of the Board has increased by a member, which was not significant. However, 
with the inclusion of members appointed by the State, the Board got more diverse, 
accounting for people with different background and experiences. Moreover, these 
members allowed the representation of most shareholders, which enables their wealth 
maximization and avoids conflicts of interest. The selection and appointment of Board 
Members kept being performed by shareholders through the Shareholder’s Agreement. 
Moreover, there were no changes in the On-Boarding, lack of training for new Board 
Members nor the incentives given to the minority shareholders.  
Most of internal control mechanisms also kept the same, with the lack of a nomination 
committee and a proper Succession plan. However, as previously mentioned, the creation 
of two new committees improved the Governance procedures.  
Overall, there were no significant changes in the Governance of TAP, mainly due to the 
fact that the members in TAP Corporate bodies have not changed radically. Moreover, 
the private consortium still has a large stake at TAP and assumes a very significant role 
in the company’s management. There were created some measures that determine the role 
of the State in TAP. However, this information could not be disclosed. 
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5. TAP Governance Limitations and Suggestions 
 
5.1.On-Boarding and Training 
The elected board and executive members should be aligned with the company's culture 
and objectives. Therefore, the company should have planned On-Boarding and Training 
events.  
On the one hand, despite the shareholders are indeed the best people to welcome the 
members who arrive at the company, an On-Boarding programme would be valuable for 
them to feel integrated within the TAP. It could be useful for the members to meet other 
people from the company and, above all, for all the new members to be educated together.  
Moreover, it should include some learning from all departments within the company, 
which implies that not only shareholders would be in charge of the education of new 
members, but also workers from other departments that could provide other insights 
regarding the business operation, that the company’s shareholders are not aware of and 
are key factors when assessing the company. Also, the meeting of members from other 
departments enhances the team spirit. Something that TAP should incite. 
On the other hand, and as previously mentioned, the governance of a company may lead 
to conflicts of interest, because the members are not aligned with the objectives of the 
company. Therefore, it is believed that training is very important, even for members with 
a large variety of experiences and expertise. That is because the business circumstances 
vary very often. Therefore, it is not rare that the interests also vary, following the 
circumstances of the company. A frequent revision of the objectives and procedures of 
the company is fundamental for the effectiveness of the board. 
 
5.2.Board Members’ Assessment 
As confirmed above, TAP does not have a formal procedure for Board performance 
assessment. This topic is a significant gap within the company. In fact, this attitude shows 
some passivity regarding the governance processes in the company. There is no effort in 
making additional improvements in the company’s procedures, which could be beneficial 
for the company, even if its governance is more or less stable. Therefore, the remuneration 
committee should be in charge of designing some mechanisms which would enable to 
evaluate the Board performance, based on quantitative metrics. This process could, on 
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the one hand, identify possible gaps within the governance practices which could be 
improved and, consequently, minimize governance and management risks. On the other 
hand, this process could hold Board members responsible for the company, because, by 
evaluating themselves and their colleagues get more conscious of their contributions to 
the company; and, by being evaluated, feel pressured to perform a better work within their 
functions.   
 
5.3.Succession Plan 
Following this, another gap in the company is the lack of a Succession Plan. This 
procedure is fundamental to ensure the perseverance of the Board's stability, through the 
constant renewal of the company. In this case, the institution should either in charge of 
the nomination committee of drawing a plan or create a specific Board Committee that 
would be responsible for the creation of a Succession Plan. 
The process of creating a solid Succession plan TAP should start with the discussion of 
the company’s objectives and definition of concrete actions to achieve these objectives, 
which could be attained, for instance, through the general or other strategy meetings.  
From this analysis, the committee would be able to identify the required competencies, 
compatible with the achievement of the proposed goals and also the positions that will 
potentially need to be filled.  Then, the internal and external scanning begins. First, the 
supposed TAP nomination committee should track the skills of actual Board members 
and potential gaps they might have. Parallel to this study, the committee should also 
search for top talent on the market, which includes searching within TAP's competitors.  
However, the choice of an internal member is the most suitable option, as it minimizes 
the risk of bad performance, because of internal know-how on company matters.  
Given this analysis, the next stage should be the choice of a successor.  
Finally, TAP’s nomination committee should consider this succession plan when 
assessing the career development of the new member and it should also serve as a support 
for the Remuneration Committee decisions. 
 
5.4.Minority Shareholders’ Participation  
Therefore, it could be concluded that the minority shareholders do not have active 
participation in the matters of the company. However, they have some passive 
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participation, as they are heard and taken into consideration through the company’s 
institutional channels, being encouraged to be aware of the topics discussed within the 
Board and, consequently, within the company. Moreover, minority shareholders are also 
responsible to ensure that the board follows the regulation regarding its procedures and 
mechanisms. According to the circumstances of the company, some arrangements could 
be made to enhance the participation of minority shareholders in TAP affairs, however, 
it still is not fundamental to the company to explore this topic. 
 
5.5.Internal Control Mechanisms  
As previously described, TAP has an established set of Internal control mechanisms. 
However, as mentioned above, the company is trying to make some changes in its 
governance mechanisms and procedures, with the aim of improving them. Therefore, 
these changes could comprise, for instance, the inclusion of outside expert members in 
the design of Corporate Governance rules and procedures. The creation of policies could 
be conducted with the help of the auditing committee, which, by monitoring corporate 
risk, is able to identify the areas where the company needs stronger policies, due to higher 
levels of risk. 
 
The suggestions presented are useful for any type of company, independently of its equity 
structure. Specifically, regarding the State, it could be concluded that if the latter’s 
behavior was comparable to the behavior of any other shareholder of this company or any 
other, its Governance would be much more effective. All these suggestions should put 
into practice and the State, as a major shareholder, should be paying more attention to the 
Governance of the company and assuming its role as the main shareholder of the company 
and not just of a member of the State, which is what happens nowadays. For the last years, 
TAP's Corporate Governance has been subject to political instability and conflict of 
interests, mainly as a consequence of the behavior of the State, which used the company 
in favor of its interests. Therefore, TAP’s Governance improvements are mainly 
dependent on the behavior of Parpública as the main owner of the company. 
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6. Research Limitations 
The topic developed within this research, which aims at describing the Corporate 
Governance differences according to the equity structure of a company, is very rich and 
could continue to be studied further. Therefore, it includes some limitations that could be 
explored.  
One the one hand, the study is mostly basis on the analysis of qualitative data. Therefore, 
it is lacking an analysis of the performance of the company, as a quantitative metric that 
enables to see if the company’s Corporate Governance practices are indeed good practices 
that positively contribute to the success of the company. A future research project could 
focus more on tangible aspects surrounding the performance of the company, which could 
be assessed through the study of the various financial and accounting statements of the 
company. Moreover, the research focused only on a single company, which may not be 
enough to draw strong conclusions. The objective of this project is to study a particular 
company and its peculiar Corporate Governance circumstances. However, deeper 
analysis of companies with different governance policies and mechanisms would be 
useful to further develop the topic. 
On the other hand, the interviewed sample within the company is very small and may not 
represent the population. Meaning, these interviews were conducted to particular 
company representatives. However, the adapted governance practices influence and are 
represented within all the company.  Despite this limitation, the interviewees’ position 
provided them with more interesting insights regarding the governance of the company. 
Therefore, due to some time and company restrictions, the project focused on this 
knowledge. On a final note, the interview insights and information disclosure by the 
company regarding its governance practices are not guaranteed to be entirely true. 
All these limitations are easily overcome through a deeper study, which would be a larger 
contribution to understand the importance of Corporate Governance to a company and 
the potential impacts that the state can provoke, in case the latter has a large contribution 
within the company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
7. Concluding Remarks  
Bearing in mind that the Corporate Governance of a company deeply affects a company 
and taking into consideration recent unfortunate events in some company's considered to 
be secure, this study was conducted in order to conclude the role that the State can take 
in the Corporate Governance of a particular company, TAP, which represents Portugal as 
one of the most well-known companies in the aviation industry.  
TAP’s Board composition includes members appointed by Parpública and by the Private 
Consortium, Atlantic Gateway, which ensures that the State assumes its role within the 
Governance of the company through members with a large variety of expertise in the 
industry. Moreover, there has been an effort regarding the improvement of TAP's 
Governance nowadays demonstrated through the creation of an Auditing committee, 
complementary to the Supervisory Board, which ensures clear management practices.  
Despite the company ensures that fundamental governance topics are carefully discussed 
and taken care of, such as the Remuneration policies and the rigorous selection of Board 
and Executive members; TAP still has larger gaps in its Corporate Governance model. 
These gaps include the lack of a formal procedure for Succession Planning, fundamental 
for the constant renewal of an organization and for the minimization of the uncertainty 
regarding the direction of the company; The inexistence of Training and On-Boarding 
programmes for new members assuming executive or non-executive roles, fundamental 
for better integration within the company, and acknowledgement of its culture and 
business operation; The missing of an effective Board Performance Assessment, a key 
procedure to conclude if the Board is succeeding while performing its role. All these gaps 
should be previewed by Parpública as key topics for the effectiveness of the company’s 
governance. This would benefit TAP as reducing conflicts of interest and the risk of 
uncertainty within the company. Moreover, it would for sure improve the performance of 
the Board members, which would be more committed to the company. As the main 
Shareholder, the State could interfere in the Governance of the company in a more 
assertive manner and assure the requirements mentioned above are fulfilled.   
Therefore, it could be concluded that the State has the largest participation in TAP’s 
equity structure, but the Private Consortium assumes a very significant role, inclusively 
assuming the management of the company. As such, both these blocks need to work 
together to assure successful governance and the stability that the company needs.  
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9. Annexes 
9.1.Parameters for Board Evaluation 
 
 
9.2.Interview Script 
 
1. Has TAP an internal set of rules for the board members selection and appointment? 
How does the selection and appointment process work? 
 
2. Which are the main, or key, factors profile factors for a board member?  
3. Which are the main steps for the "on-boarding" of a board member? Has Tap a 
specific programme for it? 
 
4. Has TAP a training plan for the members of the different corporate bodies’ members? 
If yes how does it works and for each corporate body which are the main areas 
addressed? 
 
5. Regarding the composition of the different corporate bodies are there any 
Shareholders Agreement defining the number of the members each block (private 
and public) can appoint? If yes could it be known? 
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6. Concerning the remuneration of the different members of the corporate bodies in 
the respective policy approved by the General Assembly? Or by a Remuneration 
Committee?  
 
7. Do you have a succession plan approved by the competent corporate body?   
8. Who or which body decides the Corporate Governance model/rules? How often is 
this regulation revised? 
 
9. In case of conflict of objectives between the State and the private shareholders – 
namely in the case of a political objective and an economical one - how is it solved? 
Is there any mechanism previewed? 
 
10. Are minority shareholders often forgotten because of that or are they equally 
treated? (For instance, nowadays where the workers have a minority stake of 5% at 
the company. Are they heard?).  
 
11. (For Private) Why is the composition of the governance different from when the state 
has a larger stake? Meaning, why not having a Supervisory Board and a commission 
specialized in Corporate Governance sustainability? 
 
12. In what concerns to the Audit Committee in there a regular work plan for the year? If 
yes, is the fulfillment of this plan assessed in order to close the gaps? 
 
13. (For SOE) The internal risks are much larger now than in 2017. What are they and why 
they are bigger? What did you do about it? Does it have to do with the company’s 
reputation and deficits in the governance? 
 
14. What is the internal communication policy, in order to ensure transparency inside the 
company? 
 
15. Does the company have a process for a self-assessment by each corporate body? If 
yes is it done each year? 
 
16. Is it in place a system approved by the Remuneration Committee to assess the Board 
performance? If yes could you tell which the most relevant assessment indicators 
are? 
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9.3.TAP Executive and Non-Executive Members 2015 
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9.4.TAP Executive and Non-Executive Members 2018 
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9.5.TAP Internal and External Risks 
 
 
9.6.TAP’s Corporate Governance with different equity structures 
 
 Former 
Governance 
Actual 
Governance 
Recommendations 
Topic    
On-Boarding and Training NO NO - Create Specific On-Boarding and 
Training programmes for the 
immersion of new members in the 
company’s culture and operations 
Succession Plan NO NO - Design a Succession plan to 
minimize uncertainty, through the 
creation of a specific committee 
in charge of it 
Remuneration Committee YES YES - Include the Succession plan on 
the decisions regarding 
remuneration 
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Communication Policy YES YES - Disclose more about the State’s 
role in the company’s governance 
Auditing Committee NO YES - No recommendations 
Minority Shareholders 
Participation 
MIDDLING MIDDLING - Ensure stronger active 
participation. For instance, small 
representation in a given 
committee which takes decisions 
on the company's governance 
(e.g. Nomination committee – 
which still does not exist) 
 
